We investigate the effects of homeownership on parents" involvement in local school elections.
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Introduction
The effects of homeownership on social and economic outcomes are widely discussed.
Studies have noted benefits of homeownership on outcomes such as: wealth; labour force participation; urban structure; health; demographics; self-esteem; child outcomes; and social capital outcomes such as involvement in political and social activities (Dietz and Haurin, 2003) .
In this paper, we focus on one specific social capital (child-related) outcome that is potentially affected by homeownership: parental voting turnout in local school board of trustees elections.
1 Reflecting common perceptions of homeownership effects, we hypothesise that schools in areas with higher rates of homeownership will experience a higher parental voting turnout in board of trustees elections (relative to a null of no effect). A school is a form of local amenity and the quality of amenities affects the values of properties surrounding them.
Homeowning parents have a greater incentive than renters to vote in board of trustees elections, as the board is responsible for the operation and performance of the school. If a school underperforms, this can generate an unfavourable externality on local house prices which directly affects homeowners, but not renters (indeed, rents may decline). In addition, homeowners are less mobile than renters so there is a greater cost to them if they were to shift in response to school quality, again incentivising homeowners to act (more than renters) to raise school quality.
Studies of the impact of homeownership on local outcomes have to account for the impacts of covariates that are correlated with homeownership and that themselves may impact on outcomes of interest. This is particularly important given that homeownership is commonly associated with other markers of socio-economic status such as education and income. We pay particular attention to controlling for other factors and demonstrate the importance of doing so relative to an approach that relies on simple correlations between homeownership and outcome variables. Our results indicate that there is a positive association between homeownership and parental voting turnout in school elections. However, once school and local characteristics are controlled for, there is no discernible effect of homeownership on voter turnout.
In addition to investigating the effect of homeownership on voting rates, we analyse whether homeownership rates affect the probability of a school proceeding to an election. In 2007, only around half of primary and intermediate schools proceeded to an election, whereas 75% of secondary schools held an election. Schools proceed to an election where there are more candidates than available board positions; thus having an election is a marker of parental willingness to actively serve the school in the role of (unpaid) trustee. We find that high homeownership does increase the chance of a primary school proceeding to election. Similarly, the probability of an election increases with a higher proportion of state-owned houses, consistent with the theory that housing stability (through either homeownership or state tenancy) leads to a greater sense of community relative to other forms of tenure.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of previous literature; Section 3 gives a background to the New Zealand schooling system; our methodology is outlined in Section 4; data used in the study is described in Section 5; Section 6 provides results of estimation; and conclusions are provided in Section 7.
Prior Literature
Governments in many countries formulate policies and strategies to encourage higher homeownership rates as evidence suggests that there are positive externalities associated with homeownership. In the U.S., Government policy (using tax breaks and subsidies) has consistently been directed toward encouraging citizens to become homeowners (Haurin et al., 2002; Green and White, 1997) . In New Zealand, imputed rents for owner-occupiers remain taxfree (Tax Working Group, 2010) .
One fundamental difference between homeownership and renting is the transaction cost associated with securing and vacating a dwelling (Dietz and Haurin, 2003) . Transaction costs are significantly greater for homeowners than for renters and, as a result, homeowners are likely to be less mobile, or more geographically stable, than renters. Also, the decision to own or to rent is a matter of choice that is heavily constrained and dependent on the type of dwelling a household desires to reside in (Rossi and Weber, 1996) . For example, in the U.S., if a household wants to live in a single-family detached house, they are largely confined to the ownership market as few such units are available for rent.
The benefits of owning a home can be categorised into three main types of personal and/or neighbourhood benefit (Boehm and Schlottmann, 1999) . First, for many families, homeownership is the largest investment they will ever make. Therefore, the home is an asset which will provide future financial security for those families who can afford to purchase.
Second, homeowners are able to gain a higher level of personal esteem and life satisfaction, which develops them and their children into more productive members of society. Third, reduced mobility of homeowners helps improve neighbourhood quality and stability. Reduced 3 mobility may incentivise homeowners to be more socio-politically active than renters in order to improve the neighbourhood environment, which is then capitalised into property values. Koff and Sen (2005) observed the effects of homeownership on civic effort. They argue that sustained civic efforts lead to improvements in the local environment, which are then capitalised in property values. Civic efforts, however, are not contractible, so there needs to be some incentive for households to exert more effort. As homeowners gain from increases in property values, homeownership creates an incentive for homeowners to exert greater civic effort (which includes voting in local elections) to improve the quality of their properties and community in order to raise local property values.
There are very few studies that investigate the specific relationship between school voting turnout and homeownership. However, studies have investigated the homeownership impacts on local body elections and political activity, civic effort and neighbourhood participation.
Homeowners are more incentivised than renters to be politically and socially involved in local affairs. Homeownership influences social behaviour through two channels first, homeownership is an investment that alters the financial stake of households. Local affairs can influence house prices and, subsequently, the value of the investment. Homeowners therefore have an added incentive to be active in local affairs (Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Manturuk et al, 2010) . Second, homeownership reduces the mobility of households, while renting households are relatively mobile. The reduced mobility incentivises homeowners to maintain and improve the neighbourhood"s quality-of-life, as this is directly related to their own quality-of-life and is also capitalised into the value of properties within that neighbourhood. Hence, homeowners are more likely to participate in political and community activities, and increase civic efforts, to ensure any negative externalities to their neighbourhood image are minimised (Rossi and Weber, 1996; Dipasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Koff and Sen, 2005; Manturuk et al, 2010) .
Homeowners are consistently found to vote at greater rates than renters; however the effect of homeownership on political interest is negligible (Rossi and Weber, 1996; Dietz and Haurin, 2003) . Dipasquale and Glaeser (1999) find that homeowners in the United States are 15% more likely to vote in local elections than renters and that 77% of owners had said they voted in local elections, compared with only 52% of renters. When repeating the analysis using German data, the authors found much the same behaviours, with homeownership increasing the probability of voting for low-income individuals by 4.3%, and high-income individuals by 29.1%.
Recent evidence on the impact of homeownership on voting rates is, however, less clear-cut.
While Manturuk et al (2010) find that homeownership rates have a significant positive effect on local political participation, Engelhardt et al (2010) find no evidence that such a relationship exists.
This lack of certainty means that the impact of homeownership on electoral participation remains an open question. We examine this issue using a tightly defined form of electoral involvement: voting in one"s own child"s school board of trustees election. Compared with other forms of voting, the school election is closely tied to an outcome of direct personal interest and so provides a sharper test of homeownership versus renter propensity to be politically involved than prior studies where benefits of voting are more diffused.
New Zealand Schools Background
School Governance and Structure
The governance of New Zealand schools can be broadly categorised into State, StateIntegrated and "Other". State schools receive government funding (that can be supplemented by voluntary donations). They are generally co-educational 2 and all are required to teach the New Zealand curriculum. State-integrated schools were previously private schools, but are now part of the state system. They incorporate their own special character (usually a philosophical or religious belief) into the New Zealand curriculum that they teach. Their buildings and property are privately owned, but they receive the same funding per student as state schools. In addition, they may charge compulsory fees to meet their property costs. Private, or independent, schools still receive some funding from the Government, but the majority of their funding is received from the fees they charge. They have their own independent boards which govern them and must meet certain standards to be registered with the Ministry of Education. While they are free to teach their own curriculum, it must follow a learning program similar to that of the New Zealand curriculum. There is also a range of other types of schools that cater for the specific needs of their students (Ministry of Education, 2009a) . Table 1 provides the number of schools and pupils by school governance and type. Table 1 shows that a large majority (85%) of students in New Zealand attend state schools. annually in September. The board itself can also co-opt additional trustees; however, the number of co-opted trustees cannot exceed the number of parent trustees. In the case where a vacancy for a trustee arises, the board is able to hold a by-election to fill the vacancy; however, a co-opted trustee can only be appointed if another co-opted position becomes available (Education Act, 1989) . A mid-term, or staggered, election cycle can also be adopted by the board, where half of the parent representatives are elected halfway into the current board"s term. These elections are held midway between triennial elections (18 months after triennial election).
Another feature of the reforms was the abolition of geographical school enrolment zones to enable parents to choose which school their children would attend. This created competition between schools to attract the better students. Schools that attracted an over-abundance of applications were required to employ their own enrolment scheme to avoid overcrowding within the school. In 2000, an amendment to the Education Act 1989 included the requirement that a school"s enrolment scheme could not act to exclude any student resident within the zone covered by its enrolment scheme.
The School Decile System
In 1995, the Ministry of Education introduced a system of classifying schools into deciles based on the socio-economic background of the school"s student communities, to help the Ministry determine which schools required more funding (Fiske and Ladd, 2000) . The additional funding assists schools to overcome barriers to learning that students in low socio-economic communities may face. Decile 1 schools represent the 10% of schools that have the highest proportion of students from low socio-economic communities, while decile 10 schools are the 10% of schools with the lowest proportion of students drawn from low socio-economic communities (Ministry of Education, 2009f). Accordingly, lower decile schools receive larger amounts of funding. weighted by the number of students from each meshblock. Each school is ranked in relation to all other schools for each of the five factors and receives a score for the percentile they fall into.
The unweighted total of these five scores is then used to produce the overall ranking of the school, in relation to all others in New Zealand. The schools are then allocated into one of ten deciles (Ministry of Education, 2009f).
School deciles are automatically recalculated every five years, following a new census.
However, schools are able to apply for a review through two criteria. The first is a change in the physical catchment area of the school. The second is when a school feels strongly that the socioeconomic status of the students within the school"s catchment area has changed (Ministry of Education, 2009g).
Methodology
Parental Voting Turnout in School BOT Elections
We begin our analysis with a simple weighted 16 OLS regression of the parental voting rate regressed on the (private) homeownership rate and the state-owned housing rate, 17 with no additional control variables. This provides us with a "simplistic" estimate of the relationship between private (and state) homeownership and voting participation, as may be referred to by commentators discussing simple bivariate associations between homeownership and other outcomes. We progressively introduce additional control variables to deduce whether the 10 Household income is the percentage of households with equivalent income (income adjusted for the number of adults and children in the household and the age of the children, but excludes any household that receives a benefit) in the lowest 20% nationally. 11 Occupation is the percentage of employed parents working in an occupation of skill levels 4 or 5 of the Australia and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO). These generally comprise labourers, machine operators and assemblers, and other lower skilled occupations irrespective of the sector involved. 12 Household crowding is the percentage of households with an equivalised crowding index greater than one. This index measures the proportion of household members per bedroom adjusted for the number of children under 10 years of age (every two are assumed to share one bedroom). Couples, and others, are each assigned one bedroom. 13 Educational qualification measures the percentage of parents with no tertiary or school qualifications. 14 Income support is the proportion of parents who directly received an income benefit (Domestic Purposes, Unemployment, or Sickness and Invalid"s benefit) in the previous year, but does not include parents who receive Family Support. 15 A meshblock is the smallest spatial unit used by Statistics New Zealand. In urban areas it is approximately the size of a city block; in rural areas it is similar in population size but larger in area. 16 Weighted by school size. 17 The state, through Housing New Zealand Corporation, owns approximately 5% of houses in New Zealand. As shown in Table 4 , the state-owned proportion is higher than 5% for households with school-aged children.
simplistic relationships (if they exist) are accounted for by other covariates, rather than homeownership (or state-owned housing) per se.
The first (simple) specification is presented below:
where VotingTurnout i represents the parental voting participation rate in school i"s BOT election;
HO i is the homeownership rate in the Census area unit (CAU) 18 that school i is located; SO i is the state-owned housing rate in the CAU that school i is located; β and γ represent the coefficients on HO and SO respectively; α is a constant; and ε i is the error term.
The second specification adds controls for population characteristics in order to ascertain whether the (simple) relationships between homeownership and election participation hold up after controlling for the nature of the local population. Variables included in this set are: an urban indicator variable (equal to 1 if school is located in an urban area, zero otherwise); log of CAU population per hectare (i.e. population density); log of total CAU population; proportion of households with school-aged students; population age-band proportions
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; and BOT region dummies 20 (equal to 1 if school i falls in that particular board region, zero otherwise).The second OLS specification can be represented as:
where POP i p represents the p th population characteristic (listed above) for school i; and the δ p represent the corresponding coefficients.
School characteristics are added in the third specification as a further robustness check on the homeownership/voting relationship. School characteristics include: decile dummies (equal to 1 if a school is classed in that decile, zero otherwise), school roll numbers, and the number of neighbouring schools within the same CAU (a marker of school competition).
Equation 3 represents the third specification:
18 A CAU is an aggregation of meshblocks that, in urban areas, typically corresponds to a "suburb".
where SCHAR i s represents the s th school characteristic of school i from those listed above; and the φ s represent the corresponding coefficients.
The final specification adds controls for local area characteristics. Local area (CAU) characteristics include: the proportion of residents new to the community within the last five years (from within New Zealand and overseas); the proportion of migrants; the proportion of residents who have participated in volunteer work within the last four weeks (as a measure of community social capital); the distribution of ethnicities; the proportions of structures of households (i.e. whether they are couple-parents, single-parent or other); proportion of highest qualification attained by adults; proportion of income beneficiaries; proportion employed and unemployed; log mean income and log standard deviation of income for households with school-aged children; the log mean income and log standard deviation of income for all households in the area; and the log of the median capital value of residential properties in the CAU. Equation 4 presents the fourth specification:
where LACHAR i l represents the l th local area characteristic listed above for school i; and the λ l represent the corresponding coefficients.
School BOT Election
To investigate the impact of homeownership on the probability that a school will proceed to a BOT election, we adopt a similar methodology to the analysis on the parental participation rate in elections, but we use a weighted probit model instead of a weighted OLS regression in estimation. This allows us to obtain the marginal impacts of homeownership on the probability of a school proceeding to a BOT election.
The resulting equations are similar to equations (1) to (4) 
Data Description
Data were obtained from two main sources: the Ministry of Education (MoE) and Statistics New Zealand (SNZ). The school voting and school characteristics data were sourced from MoE, while population and local area characteristics were sourced from SNZ. Additionally, we obtained the median capital values of properties in local areas from Quotable Value New Zealand (QVNZ). The data are explained in more detail below.
School Board of Trustees Election Data
MoE took over the collection and reporting of BOT elections in 2004. It stores records on parents" voting paper return rates, i.e. the number of voting papers sent out to parents in a BOT election, along with the number of voting papers returned. These voting paper return rates represent our dependent variable (parental voting turnout in school BOT elections (VoteTurnout)). MoE were only able to provide data on parent voting paper return rates from the 2007 triennial elections. 21 Many schools were missing voting results, due to those schools not proceeding to election. The latter data were used to construct our binary Vote i variable.
School Characteristics Data
MoE supplied school roll numbers from the July 2007 school roll returns. The data detail the total number of students enrolled in each school. School decile ratings for 2007 are also provided by MoE, as are data for the attainment level of secondary school leavers for each school. The latter data detail the proportion of students who gain university entrance (UE) or better, NCEA level 2 or better, NCEA level 1 or better, and little or no formal attainment. We create two attainment variables, high qualifications and no qualifications. High qualifications represents the proportion of school leavers with UE or better qualifications; no qualifications represents the proportion of students who leave school with no formal school qualification, i.e.
those below NCEA level 1.
Population and Local Area Characteristics Data
We use 2006 individual unit record data from SNZ"s Census of Population and
Dwellings to compile demographic and economic characteristics of households with school-aged children. 22 Individual unit record data is only available in the SNZ data laboratory. Given its high confidentiality, the individual unit record data obtained from SNZ are subject to SNZ"s confidentiality rules.
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The census variables compiled are: an urban/rural dummy, population density, proportion of one-family households, proportion of people new to a community, proportion of foreign-born residents, ethnicity proportions, household structure, highest qualifications, proportion of income beneficiaries, employment status, proportion participating in volunteer work, mean dwelling income.
Data Samples for Analysis
We analyse four different samples of data, determined by the school type (full primary, contributing primary, intermediate, and secondary school). The age brackets of students enrolled differ across school types. Only parents of students enrolled at a particular school are able to vote in the BOT election of that school. Therefore, we restrict each school type"s data to measure only households with students in the appropriate age brackets. For each sample, we only consider state and state-integrated schools, as these are the only schools required to hold BOT elections. 
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Before presenting estimation results, we provide descriptive statistics of all variables. 
Parental Voting Turnout in School BOT Elections
One of our two key objectives is to investigate whether a school located in an area of high homeownership rates (for households with school-aged children) experiences a higher rate of parental voting turnout in school BOT elections relative to its corresponding school sample. Table 5 reports the weighted OLS regression results of the relationship between homeownership and state-owned housing variables, and parental voting turnout. Specifically, we attempt to identify whether homeownership has any effect on parents" voting habits. significance at 1% level of significance. * indicates significance at the 5% level of significance. + indicates significance at the 10% level of significance. Numbers contained within parentheses represent standard errors. School characteristics added in Panel C include: decile dummy variables (decile 5 omitted as base) and the log of school roll. Local area characteristics added in Panel D include: one-family households, new to community within last five years, foreign-born, ethnicity categories (Pakeha omitted as base), household structure categories (couple households omitted as base), highest qualification categories (no qualifications omitted as base), income beneficiaries, employment statuses, volunteer work within the last four weeks, and log of mean dwelling income.
Panel A in Table 5 reports the results from the simple regression of parental voting turnout on the homeownership rate and state-owned housing rate with no additional control variables (equation (1)), to observe whether homeownership or state-owned housing rates have a significant association with voting rates. Panels B through to D represent results from estimating equations (2) - (4), where we progressively introduce additional control variables. These extensions enable us to infer whether the simple associations are accounted for by other covariates that are themselves correlated with homeownership or state-owned housing.
From Table 5 coefficients are now negative and none is significant. Three of the state-owned housing rate coefficients are negative, with the coefficient for contributing primary schools being negative and significant at the 5% level. Thus, we observe that a higher prevalence of state-owned housing in a local area lowers the turnout of parental voting in a contributing primary school BOT vote.
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that while the rate of homeownership is positively associated with parental voting turnout in school elections, once controls for population, school and local area characteristics are added, we find no impact of the homeownership rate on voter turnout. For the state-owned housing rate, we find a significant (negative) effect only for contributing schools once all covariates are added. These results provide a useful caution regarding use of simple associations between homeownership and outcome variables that may not be robust to controls for other (correlated) variables. at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and all estimates are weighted by school size and hence represent the relationships for the average pupil. Board regions were control for, but are not presented.
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The full estimation results from Panel D are provided in Table 6 . For full primary and secondary schools, we observe that a higher proportion of dwellings with eligible children decreases parental voting turnout, and the size of the school roll is negatively related to voting turnout. These results are consistent with a hypothesis that parents are less likely to vote if there are more potential voters present. In these circumstances, parents may consider that their own vote will not influence the overall result of the outcome, and they therefore abstain from voting.
The decile indicators imply that voting turnout is positively related to affluence. Schools with a larger proportion of students from more (less) socio-economically deprived communities receive lower (higher) rates of voting from parents of those students. The trend is most apparent in primary schools, although the secondary schools results suggest that high decile communities participate more strongly in school elections than low or middle decile communities.
For secondary schools, a high proportion of households that are new to the community has a significant negative effect on the voting rate. Newly resided parents may have a less welldeveloped sense of the local community or know fewer candidates, resulting in a lower likelihood of voting in BOT elections. In primary schools, single-parent households are less likely to vote, while a higher proportion of Maori households reduces voter turnout for full primary schools. A high proportion of people who volunteer within the community is associated with a higher rate of voting in full primary BOT elections. This variable may be proxying for people with an inherently high level of social capital and community involvement, with these same traits carrying through to election participation.
Probit Analysis of the Likelihood of BOT Elections
While the homeownership rate is found to have no effect on the parental voting participation rate in school BOT elections once other characteristics are controlled for, it may affect whether a school proceeds to a BOT election. The main reason for a school not proceeding to election is that it receives no more candidates than there are positions available, and the school therefore does not require an election.
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From Table 3 , approximately half of each primary school type and three-quarters of secondary schools proceeded to a BOT election in 2007. We use probit regressions to investigate the possible homeownership and other influences on the probability that a school proceeded to a BOT election (as outlined in section 4). Table 7 presents the results from this analysis, highlighting the marginal effects of the homeownership rate and state-owned housing rate on the likelihood that a school will proceed to a BOT election. significance at 1% level of significance. * indicates significance at the 5% level of significance. + indicates significance at the 10% level of significance. Numbers contained within parentheses represent robust standard errors. School characteristics added in Panel C include: decile dummy variables (decile 5 omitted as base) and the log of school roll. Local area characteristics added in Panel D include: one-family households, new to community within last five years, foreign-born, ethnicity categories (Pakeha omitted as base), household structure categories (couple households omitted as base), highest qualification categories (no qualifications omitted as base), income beneficiaries, employment statuses, volunteer work within the last four weeks, and log of mean dwelling income.
When there are no additional covariates (Panel A), we observe that the homeownership rate is associated with an increased probability of a BOT election being held for all school types, with significant effects for both full primary and contributing primary schools. The state-owned housing rate increases the probability of a BOT election for most schools, but only significantly for full primary schools. Adding controls for population composition, density and urbanisation (Panel B), we observe similar results to the previous model: a significant positive effect from homeownership on the probability of holding a BOT election in full primary and contributing primary schools, and no significant effect of the state-owned housing rate on the probability of a BOT election. Panel C adds controls for school characteristics. The effect of homeownership is now no longer significant for any school type (with the exception of a weakly significant result for contributing primary schools). State-owned housing rates significantly increase the probability of a BOT election within intermediate schools (with a weak effect also for full primary schools).
Panel D adds controls for local area characteristics. This full model, with all covariates included, indicates that homeownership significantly increases the chance that a full primary or contributing primary school will hold a BOT election. Similarly, a high prevalence of state-owned housing significantly increases the chance of a BOT election for full primary and intermediate schools (with a weak effect also for secondary schools).
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Thus, we observe that the probability of a BOT election being held in (full and contributing) primary schools is significantly and positively affected by homeownership rates, but the same effect is not observed for schools catering just to older age groups (intermediate and secondary schools). The estimated coefficients imply that full (contributing) primary schools with a 10 percentage point higher local area homeownership rate are 5.5 (7.9) percentage points more likely to hold a BOT election. Given that only around 50% of primary schools hold a BOT election these are fairly large effect sizes.
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One explanation for these results may be that homeownership increases people"s sense of community, since it has been shown to increase their enthusiasm towards being involved in local community affairs (Roskruge et al, 2011) . A higher rate of homeownership may therefore lead to more parents standing for the board, increasing the probability of a school holding an election. The spatial catchment of primary schools is generally more focused on a local community than are those for intermediate and secondary schools. Homeowners may be less enthusiastic in standing for these larger schools that service multiple communities, as they do not feel as great an affinity or affiliation with those outside their immediate local community. : * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and all estimates are weighted by school size and hence represent the relationships for the average pupil. Board regions were control for, but are not presented.
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The significant (positive) coefficient on the state-owned housing rate accords with the finding in Roskruge et al (2011) that state tenants have a statistically similar sense of community to homeowners, with each having a significantly greater sense of community than private renters.
The estimated coefficients imply that full primary schools with a 1 percentage point higher local area state-owned housing rate are 1 percentage point more likely to hold a BOT election. The mean school only has 6 percent of the local housing being state-owned so effect sizes are similar to those for homeownership. These results suggest that the security of the long-term tenancies available to state tenants (relative to private tenants) has positive social capital spin-offs for the local community.
The full set of results of the probit regression with all covariates included is presented in Table 8 . The size of a school has a significant and positive effect on the probability of a school holding an election; this applies to all school types analysed. Larger schools will have a greater pool of parents from which potential candidates for the board may arise and, therefore, less chance that the school will have a lack of candidates to force an election. A consistent finding with the VoteTurnout results is that a school is more (less) likely to hold an election if it is high (low) decile. High (low) socio-economic parents may have more (less) self-esteem, or available time, than other parents and therefore be more willing to put themselves forward as a candidate.
Conclusions
Many countries have implemented policies to boost homeownership rates with the aim of improving household and community outcomes. Prior evidence indicates that homeowners are more politically active than renters and have higher voting rates in political elections.
Homeowners are also less mobile and have invested a large financial stake in their own property, and are therefore more incentivised to improve the quality of their neighbourhood.
We have analysed one aspect of political participation and civic effort, investigating the effect of homeownership rates on parental voting turnout and parental participation in school board of trustees elections. All state and state-integrated schools in New Zealand are required to hold a board of trustees election triennially, and parents are able to stand for, and elect, parental representatives to the board. Parental voting is not compulsory, and schools receive widely varying rates of parental voting.
We utilise data on the 2007 school board of trustees elections to estimate the effect of homeownership on parental voting turnout in schools. Four samples of data were analysed, one for each of the school types: full primary, contributing primary, intermediate, and secondary 24 school. Simple weighted OLS regressions, where only the homeownership rate and the rate of state-owned housing were controlled for, found a positive association between homeownership and parental voting turnout in all school types. There was a negative association between the state-owned housing rate and the parental voting turnout. The effects on voter turnout of homeownership and of state-owned housing rates fall away once additional controls are included for population, school and local area characteristics. The implications of these estimates are that homeownership has no discernible effect on the parental voting turnout once other factors, such as school size and decile ratings are controlled for. State-ownership rates are found to have a negative impact on voting turnout only for contributing primary schools once other factors are controlled for.
Homeownership, however, consistently affects the chance that a primary school proceeds to a school BOT election. Based on prior literature, we conjecture that homeownership increases owners" sense of community and, therefore, increases their willingness to stand as a candidate for the board. However, this behaviour does not carry through to intermediate and secondary schools, which generally service larger communities. As the community size increases, the affinity and enthusiasm for homeowners to stand for a board decreases, hence decreasing the probability that these schools proceed to a BOT election. As the state-housing rate increases, the probability of proceeding to an election again rises (for three of the four school types).
The results for the probability of holding an election are consistent with the theory that housing stability (either through owner-occupation or through a state tenancy) leads to a greater sense of community and civic involvement for those in such forms of tenure. However, this effect seems limited to direct personal participation in school affairs. We find no broader benefits of homeownership or of state-ownership in enhancing parents" involvement in participatory democracy in the form of "school voice".
